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ARBI301 (a) OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcrPlaintiff-union brought an action under section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act1 to compel arbitration of a grievance over the subcontracting of work by defendant-employer. The collective bargaining
agreement provided that questions as to the proper interpretation or application of any of the provisions of the agreement would be submitted to arbitration and that all matters involving exclusively managerial functions were
excluded from arbitration. The trial court held the grievance not arbitrable. On appeal, held, reversed. An implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealings and the fact that some private arbitrators have held that the
conventional recognition clause by implication prohibits unrestricted employer subcontracting prevent the court from saying with positive assurance
that the contract is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the
dispute. Local 1912, International Association of Machinists v. United
States Potash Co., (10th Cir. 1959) 270 F. (2d) 496.
There are two questions raised by an assertion that a grievance must
be arbitrated. One, termed the "question of arbitrability," is concerned with
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator over the grievance and requires a determination of whether defendant has promised to arbitrate the particular
LABOR LAW-ARBITRATION-DETERMINATION OF THE QUESTION OF

TRABILITY UNDER SECTION

l 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §185 (a). "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter .•. may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
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grievance.2 Since this determination necessitates interpretation of the contract, leaving the decision to the arbitrator would be in harmony with the
conclusion of labor law scholars that the arbitrator is better able to interpret the collective bargaining contract.3 But the general rule is that it is
for the court to decide the question of arbitrability unless the parties expressly contract otherwise.4 The second question raised in the assertion that
a grievance must be arbitrated concerns the merits of the grievance: that is,
whether defendant's acts are prohibited by the contract.5 The general rule
in the federal courts is that the arbitrator should decide this question, since
this is the intent of the parties as indicated by their promises to arbitrate
grievances. However, two types of cases have· arisen in which this rule has
been modified by some courts. 6 The first type of case is represented by
2 This is true so long as the duty to arbitrate arises only from contract. Excluding the
principal case, the general rule in the federal courts has been that grievances over subcontracting are not arbitrable in the absence of express restrictions upon subcontracting.
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., (5th Cir. 1959) 269 F.
(2d) 633, cert. granted 28 U.S. I.Aw WEEK 3181 (1959); Dairy, Bakery and Food Workers
v. Grand Rapids Milk Division, (W.D. Mich. 1958) 160 F. Supp. 34. See Local Division
1509 v. Eastern Mass. Street Railway Co., (D.C. Mass. 1958) 162 F. Supp. 942 (dictum that
recognition clause does not make grievance arbitrable). But see Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. NLRB, (6th Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 949 at 955 (dictum that subcontracting grievance
is arbitrable). State law can also be considered by the federal courts in fashioning federal
labor law. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 at 456-457 (1957). The state
courts generally hold the subcontracting grievance not arbitrable where there are no express
restrictions on subcontracting. See, e.g., United Dairy Workers v. Detroit Creamery Co.,
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1956) 30 CCH Lab. Cas. ,i70115.
3 The peculiarities in the collective bargaining process result in a contract in which
the rights and duties of the parties are not adequately reflected by the written words.
As a result, interpretation is better done by a private arbitrator familiar with these peculiarities, the particular industry, the parties, and their past relationships. See Cox, "Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration," 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1959); Shulman, "Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations,'' 68 HARv. L. REv. 999 (1955). See also the comments
of Judge Magruder in Local 149 v. General Electric Co., (1st Cir. 1957) 250 F. (2d) 922 at
926-927, cert. den. 356 U.S. 938 (1957), and the articles there cited.
4 See, e.g., principal case at 497-498; Local 201 v. General Electric Co., (1st Cir. 1959)
262 F. (2d) 265 at 267. See, generally, 24 A.L.R. (2d) 752 at 766-767 (1952). The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit takes the contrary view. Food Handlers Local 425 v. Pluss
Poultry, Inc., (8th Cir. 1958) 260 F. (2d) 835. Judge Magruder has suggested two rationales
in support of the general rule. The more doubtful is that the United States Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. (1958) §§1-14, applies and requires the court to decide this question. The
other theory jg that since plaintiff establishes federal jurisdiction under §301 (a) by supported allegations that the refusal to arbitrate constitutes a contract violation, the court
must find a contract violation before the relief sought can be granted. Local 149 v. General
Electric Co., note 3 supra, at 927-930. For discussion of the status of the Arbitration Act as
applied to collective bargaining agreements, see note, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 462 (1958).
The general rule supports the conclusion that the court can decide whether a party
seeking to compel arbitration has complied with the contract's procedural requirements
for submitting a grievance to arbitration. Local 19322 v. American Brass Co., (7th Cir.
1959) 28 U.S. I.Aw WEEK 2322 (1960); Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents'
Intl. Union, (1st Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 516.
5 The general rule in the federal and state courts is that subcontracting does not constitute a violation of the contract where there are no express restrictions on subcontracting.
See 57 A.L.R. (2d) 1399 (1958). See also note 12 infra.
6 There are also problems involving judicial intervention in the arbitration process
after the arbitrator has made an award. In Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp. v. United
Steelworkers of America, (4th Cir. 1959) 269 F. (2d) 327, cert. granted 28 U.S. I.Aw WEEK
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United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., where the court
decided that the grievance was arbitrable under the arbitration clause of the
contract, but refused to compel arbitration because the grievance was
"frivolous."7 While the court's emphasis in reaching this conclusion was on
evaluating the sufficiency of the facts alleged in support of the merits of
plaintiffs grievance, dismissal of the grievance as frivolous indicates that
the court had also arrived at some interpretation of the contract provisions
which regulated this kind of grievance.8 Both the view that the arbitrator
is a better interpreter of the collective bargaining agreement and the idea
that the parties intended the arbitrator to decide the merits compel the
conclusion that this was an unjustified encroachment upon the arbitrator's
function of deciding the merits. Opposed to this, the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit has. held that a grievance does not cease to be arbitrable even though the result on the merits is clear under the contract.9
The second type of case is represented by United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co.,1° where the court, in deciding that a
grievance over subcontracting was not arbitrable, also became involved in
contract interpretations which would determine the merits of the grievance.
However, given the rule that the court must decide whether defendant has
promised to arbitrate the particular grievance, it appears that the particular
arbitration provisions of the contract forced the court to decide the merits
question. The contract provided that matters which were strictly a function
of management were not subject to arbitration. Whether the grievance was
3207 (1960), the union sought to compel management to comply with an arbitration award
ordering reinstatement of wrongfully discharged employees and reimbursement for lost
wages. The contract had terminated before the award was made and had not been renewed.
The court modified the award by omitting the requirements of reinstatement and reimbursement for wages lost after the contract had terminated, on the theory that these rights
of the employees remained in force only for the life of the contract.
7 (6th Cir. 1959) 264 F. (2d) 624, cert. granted 28 U.S. LAw WEEK 3148 (1959). This
represents an adoption of the Cutler-Hammer doctrine, wherein a court, before compelling
arbitration, must find not only that defendant promised to arbitrate the particular dispute
but also that there is a bona fide dispute. Intl. Assn. of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, 271
App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S. (2d) 317 (1947), affd. per curiam 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E. (2d) 464
(1947). See 24 A.L.R. (2d) 752 at 762-764 (1952); note, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 278 (1959).
8 A partial justification for this decision on the merits would be that the court was
construing the contract most strongly in plaintiff's favor but that plaintiff was still unable
to state a good claim.
9 New Bedford Defense Products Div. v. Local No. 1113, (1st Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 522.
10 Note 2 supra. The task of the court was complicated by unclear drafting. The
contract provided that there were to be no lockouts, that certain matters were exclusively
within the jurisdiction of management provided that there was no discrimination against
union employees, and that exclusively-management functions were not subject to arbitration. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., (S.D. Ala.
1958) 168 F. Supp. 702. Since the union alleged that the subcontracting was discriminatory
and that it effected a partial lockout, the court, besides deciding that subcontracting was
within the clause excluding management functions from arbitration, also had to decide
whether such clause was qualified by the discrimination and lockout clauses. The ruling
that management functions were exempted absolutely from arbitration would mean that
the union might successfully prove to the court a violation of the lockout provision by use
of a management function and yet get no arbitration on the matter.
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arbitrable depended upon whether subcontracting was strictly a management function, which in tum depended upon whether there were any ex.press or implied restrictions on subcontracting. But whether the union was
right on the merits of the grievance also depended on whether there were
any express or implied restrictions on subcontracting.11 The arbitration
provisions in the principal case were similar to those in Warrior and Gulf.
To decide whether a grievance over subcontracting was arbitrable, the
court would have to decide whether subcontracting was an exclusive managerial function; and to answer this question the court would have to make
contract interpretations which would decide the merits of the grievance.
The court held that the differences of opinion among the courts and arbitrators as to whether restrictions on subcontracting should be implied from
the conventional recognition clause were enough to make the grievance
arbitrable, but it was careful not to rule that there were any such restrictions.12 This result appears to be the desirable one, being in line with
scholars' suggestions that the arbitrator is a better interpreter of the collective bargaining contract, and with the idea that the parties intended the
arbitrator to decide the merits. However, given the rule that the court must
decide the question of arbitrability,13 it is difficult to justify this result in
legal theory. In not deciding whether subcontracting was restricted, the
court did not decide whether it was an exclusive managerial function, and
therefore did not really decide that defendant had promised to arbitrate
this grievance. The court in effect held that defendant possibly promised
to arbitrate this grievance.
A proposed statute by the National Academy of Arbitrators would solve
this problem by allowing the arbitrator to decide both the question of arbitrability and the merits of the grievance, with judicial review of the arbitrator's determination of the question of arbitrability.14 A party seeking to
11 The court in Engineers Assn. v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., (2d Cir. 1957) 251 F. (2d)
133, cert. den. 356 U.S. 932 (1957), faced a similar problem.
12 The private arbitration cases provide a rich source of concepts. The arbitrators
are split on whether subcontracting is prohibited by the contract in absence of express
restrictions. See Bethlehem Steel Co., 30 Lab. Arb. Rep. 678 at 682 (1958) for a citation of
cases. See National Tube Co., 17 Lab. Arb. Rep. 790 at 793 (1951) for a theory restricting
subcontracting by implication from the recognition clause.
13 The court in the principal case appears to approve of the rule. Principal case at
497-498.
14 The court is to decide the question of arbitrability when the contract expressly so
provides. Draft 3, proposed United States Labor Arbitration Act, National Academy of
Arbitrators. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has judicially promulgated the
same rule. Food Handlers Local 425 v. Pluss Poultry, Inc., note 4 supra. Compare the
Uniform Arbitration Act, §2, which also eliminates the use of the Cutler-Hammer doctrine.
9 ULA 79 (1957). Minnesota adopted the Uniform Act in 1957. Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947;
Supp. 1959) §§572.08-572.30.
Section 13 (3) of the statute proposed by the N.A.A. authorizes the court to vacate an
award "to the extent that the award is affected by the arbitrator's determination of an
issue which he has no jurisdiction to determine.•.. The award shall not be vacated if there
was a reasonable basis for the arbitrator's determination, express or implicit, of his
jurisdiction." In a Warrior and Gulf-type case, where the determinations of the merits
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compel arbitration would have to prove only the existence of a general
promise to arbitrate grievances and would not have to prove further that the
promise to arbitrate encompasses the particular grievance. In the absence
of such a statute, the principal case can be regarded as standing for the
proposition that where a court in deciding the question of arbitrability
finds itself involved with contract interpretations which would also determine the merits, the court must compel arbitration and allow the arbitrator
to decide both questions.11•
Cecil R. Mellin

and of jurisdiction overlap, in theory the arbitrator could decide on the merits that subcontracting was a violation of the contract, and the court could decide that the arbitrator
had no jurisdiction because subcontracting was not restricted by the contract. Query
whether the court should review the arbitrator's determination of his jurisdiction in such
a case. This problem would have to be considered under both the proposed statute and
the rule promulgated by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
115 This is similar to the position of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
except for that court's provision for judicial review of the arbitrator's determination of the
question of arbitrability. Food Handlers Local 425 v. Pluss Poultry, Inc., note 4 supra.

